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We present a formal semantics for epistemic logic, capturing the notion of know-
ability relative to information (KRI). Like Dretske, we move from the platitude that
what an agent can know depends on her (empirical) information. We treat oper-
ators of the form KAB (‘B is knowable on the basis of information A’) as variably
strict quantifiers over worlds with a topic- or aboutness-preservation constraint.
Variable strictness models the non-monotonicity of knowledge acquisition while
allowing knowledge to be intrinsically stable. Aboutness-preservation models the
topic-sensitivity of information, allowing us to invalidate controversial forms of
epistemic closure while validating less controversial ones. Thus, unlike the standard
modal framework for epistemic logic, KRI accommodates plausible approaches to
the Kripke-Harman dogmatism paradox which bear on non-monotonicity or on
topic-sensitivity. KRI also strikes a better balance between agent idealization and a
non-trivial logic of knowledge ascriptions.
1. Introduction
We expect a framework for epistemic logic1 to perform a balancing
act. It should yield sufficient logical structure to justify the use of
formal tools. It should allow the study of a kind of agent that is of
genuine interest. There’s a well-known tension between the desiderata.
Emphasis on the former can pull toward modelling idealized agents
with unbounded cognitive powers. Emphasis on the latter can pull
toward logics that are either too complex and specialized to be can-
didates for a general framework or too weak to be of serious interest.
What knowledge facts follow from ordinary agent Sarah’s knowing
that both A and B? Perhaps she has failed to unpack her belief, so
she need not know that A. As the contents of Sarah’s attitudes are,
1 See Meyer (2001), van Ditmarsch et al. (2008), and van Benthem (2011) for recent
introductions.
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plausibly, extremely fine-grained, she needn’t know that C, where C is
logically equivalent to the conjunction of A and B.
Further, we expect a general framework for epistemic logic to main-
tain a second balancing act if it is to be useful for philosophers. It
should be flexible enough to represent a range of competing positions
in philosophical debates, filling the traditional role of logic as a philo-
sophically neutral tool. It should, however, furnish a core epistemic
logic capturing substantial, but relatively uncontroversial, aspects of
the knowledge concept.
By this measure, standard epistemic logic in the tradition of
Hintikka (1962) is remarkably successful. It has the tractability of an
unadorned modal logic. It offers a base logic of substance, namely,
system K. It is expressive enough to embed a natural framework for
knowledge update: public announcement logic (PAL).2 It has found
widespread use in game theory and computer science (Fagin et al.
1995; van Benthem 2011; van Ditmarsch et al. 2015). It has proven
useful in philosophy as a tool for formalizing theories of knowledge
that differ on the issue of introspection, and for framing epistemic
paradoxes (Williamson 2000; van Benthem 2004; Kvanvig 2006).
Finally, as already observed by (Hintikka, 1962, §2), in spite of lacking
plausibility as a logic of ordinary knowledge ascriptions, the standard
framework can be interpreted in ways that promise some relevance to
ordinary agents.
Nevertheless, the framework has shortcomings. With respect to the
first balancing act, it is widely viewed as tipping too far in the direc-
tion of idealization (Fagin et al. 1995; Humberstone 2016). With re-
spect to the second balancing act, there is a growing realization that it
is not flexible enough to capture key positions in current epistemolo-
gical debates: far from offering a neutral tool for formalization, it is
committed to philosophically controversial theses.
The problem of logical omniscience cuts across these concerns
(Stalnaker 1991). The standard framework has two core features: logical
truths are always known; knowledge is closed under known implication.
Now, not only do ordinary agents fail to appreciate consequences of their
knowledge that they haven’t explicitly deduced, let alone those they
cannot conceptualize; it is also philosophically controversial whether
even fully rational, cognitively ideal agents enjoy logical omniscience.
2 PAL was introduced by Plaza, in a work that appeared eventually as Plaza (2007). For a
general introduction to dynamic epistemic logic, see van Benthem (2011). Standard epistemic
logic can embed PAL via reduction axioms, defining dynamic epistemic operators via static
ones plus non-epistemic logical vocabulary.
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Witness the growing contingent of epistemologists that are sympathetic
to ‘closure denial’ (Dretske 1970, 2005; Nozick 1981; Schaffer 2007; Lawlor
2013; Yablo 2014; Holliday 2015; Hawke 2016).
The standard picture of knowledge update, upon which public an-
nouncement logic is founded, is likewise questionable. On this picture,
an agent’s knowledge grows monotonically: invariably, more informa-
tion results in more, or at least no less, knowledge, if we ignore epi-
stemic claims that report on the agent’s current body of knowledge.3
Now, not only are ordinary agents subject to deception, imperfect
recall, and irrational aspects of their psychology that can lead to
belief updates undermining knowledge; monotonicity is philosophic-
ally controversial, again, even for cognitively ideal, fully rational
agents—as we will discuss extensively in §2.3.
Both closure and monotonicity will be core issues for this work,
which aims at striking a better twofold balance than the standard
framework: we introduce a formal semantics for epistemic logic that
relaxes the constraints of closure and monotonicity while maintaining
both a high degree of simplicity and non-trivial logical properties.
Some idealization is inevitable in the development of a worthwhile
epistemic logic. As in Hintikka (1962), we do not aim for a logic that
governs ordinary knowledge attributions per se. Rather, we intend to
capture the notion of knowability relative to information (KRI). Our
key question is: if her total information is A, what knowledge can a
fully rational and computationally unbounded agent base on that in-
formation? Thus we abstract away from certain contingent cognitive
handicaps and focus on the quality of the information available to the
agent. This echoes a prominent interpretation of the standard frame-
work as a logic of (hard) information (van Benthem, 2011, ch. 2).
We take inspiration from Dretske (1999).4 Dretske stresses that
knowledge depends on the (empirical) information available to us.
We understand information propositionally (one has, or acquires,
the information that A).5 The role of incoming information is to
3 PAL accommodates Moorean phenomena (Holliday and Icard 2010). Take p ^ ‰Kp. The
agent might come to learn this (say, by testimony). But the outcome is not the truth of
K ðp ^ ‰KpÞ, since the update of the agent’s knowledge renders ‰Kp false. Update in public
announcement logic is monotonic if one restricts attention to non-epistemic claims. This last
feature is contentious.
4 We adopt various basic insights from Dretske (1999). However, we need not be taken to
endorse the detailed (probabilistic) theory of information defended by (Dretske, 1999, ch. 3).
5 We mention a departure from Dretske’s basic commitments (see §4 below): he takes all
information to be veridical. Our proposed framework, in contrast, is compatible with there
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narrow down the set of epistemically viable alternatives. We read
‘KAB’ as ‘If the total given information were A, then B would be
knowable’; alternatively, ‘B can be known on the basis of total infor-
mation A’. Our focus will be the logic and semantics of knowability
ascriptions of the form ‘KAB’.
Thus we treat knowability ascriptions as conditional claims. Epistemic
logic, then, becomes a type of conditional logic. Arguably, this impulse
is implicit in the standard framework.6 We make it explicit. The infor-
mation-theoretic focus will allow us to address issues of knowledge
update in a static system that does not deploy the full machinery of a
dynamic logic.7 Our basic system will invalidate monotonicity: infor-
mation can grow while knowledge depletes. On the other hand, it will
validate transitivity as capturing the less controversial sense in which
knowledge is ‘stable in the face of new information’.
Our formal semantics also combines the possible worlds apparatus
with an account of topics.8 The former element allows us to retain
many advantages of the dominant model-theoretic approach to epi-
stemic logic. The latter element—a simple mereology of contents,
drawing on Berto (2018a, 2018b)—allows a subtle mix: controversial
forms of epistemic closure are invalidated, while less controversial ones
are validated. Topic-sensitivity can model the limitations of an agent’s
conceptual apparatus, a crucial source of closure failure in ordinary
agents, even logically astute ones. But the topic-sensitivity of know-
ledge claims, plausibly inherited from an intrinsic topic-sensitivity of
information, also provides the most compelling route to closure re-
jection even for highly idealized agents who have mastery over all
concepts, as argued by Yablo (2014, ch. 7) and Hawke (2016).9
being non-veridical information. Our arguments in support of this framework are consistent
with allowing only veridical information, however. On the debate concerning the factivity of
information, see Floridi (2015).
6 The standard framework models agent a’s epistemic situation as a set of possible worlds,
most straightforwardly understood as a’s information or knowledge. Ascriptions Kaf are then
naturally understood as capturing what is knowable on this basis. Various proposed readings draw
out the conditionality. Consider the preferred interpretation in Hintikka (1962): Kap means
roughly ‘relative to her knowledge, a is permitted to infer p’. Or consider a purely descriptive
interpretation raised in Hintikka (1962, §2.10): ‘it follows from what a knows that p’.
7 This is not to say that our system has the expressive power of a properly dynamic system,
nor that pursuing a dynamic variant of our system is without interest.
8 See Hawke (2017a) for a detailed appraisal of recent work on topicality.
9 The proposal that knowledge ascriptions are question-sensitive provides another intri-
guing route (Schaffer 2007). As Yablo (2014) notes, the two are closely related.
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Proponents of monotonicity, or of epistemic closure, often empha-
size the intuitions that deduction preserves knowledge and that know-
ledge, as per the venerable Platonic tradition of episte´me, rests on
conclusive grounds that render it stable. But our framework identifies
a closure principle and a stability principle that, we submit, can be
accepted by all hands in such debates. Monotonicity and closure dis-
contents needn’t reject ordinary intuitions—only certain formulations
of those intuitions.
Finally, notwithstanding our focus on what is knowable in prin-
ciple, the KRI framework can model important cognitive limitations
of an agent. Topic-sensitivity can be used to model the limits on an
agent’s conceptual resources. Our variably strict operators can also
model cognitive systems sensitive to the logical complexity of a
piece of information. §11 offers remarks in this direction.10
We proceed as follows. §2 furnishes preliminaries and presents a
version of the standard framework for epistemic logic. We motivate its
limitations via a convenient case study: the Kripke-Harman dogma-
tism paradox. As we highlight there, the paradox can be split into sub-
paradoxes concerning monotonicity and closure, respectively. §§3-4
introduce the KRI semantics. §§5–11 discuss various principles it val-
idates and invalidates. In particular, §6 addresses the non-monoton-
icity of KRI, delivered by the variable strictness of our KA operators;
§§8 and 9 address the failures of forms of logical omniscience and of
closure under strict implication, delivered by the topic-sensitivity of
KA. §11 notes that our binary epistemic operators invalidate principles
sometimes (for example, in Gabbay 1985) billed as core to conditional
logic. We discuss the desirability of meeting these principles in our
context. §12 flags further work and concludes.
2. Preliminaries
2.1 Language
We work with a sentential language L with a non-empty set LAT of
atomic formulae, p, q, r (p1, p2, …); negation, ‰; conjunction, ^; dis-
junction, _; a strict conditional, 3; a two-place epistemic operator, K;
10 This raises a question that we postpone for further work: how does our system compare
to extant modifications of epistemic logic for capturing bounded cognition? In particular, it is
worth drawing out similarities and contrasts with the tradition that extends the standard
framework with a notion of awareness, conceptualization, entertainment or explicit belief. See,
for instance, Levesque (1984), Fagin and Halpern (1988), and (van Benthem, 2011, ch. 5).
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and round parentheses as auxiliary symbols. We use ‘atom’ as short-
hand for ‘atomic formula’. We use A, B, C ðA1, A2, …Þ, as metavari-
ables for formulae ofL. The well-formed formulae are items inLAT ,
and if A and B are formulae:
‰A j ðA ^ BÞ j ðA _ BÞ j ðA 3BÞ j KAB
Outermost brackets are omitted by default. Expressions of the form
‘KA’ work similarly to sententially indexed modals (see Chellas 1975).
We use  for the material conditional, defined in the usual manner. In
the metalanguage we use variables w, w1, w2, …, ranging over possible
worlds, and x, y, z ðx1, x2, …Þ, ranging over topics (these will officially
enter the stage in §3), as well as the symbols ) , , , &, or ,  , 8, 9,
with the usual reading. We now look at a standard epistemic logic,
semantically presented, for L.
2.2 A standard epistemic logic
The standard approach to (multi-agent) epistemic logic uses the fol-
lowing core ideas. A body of information is modelled as a set of pos-
sible worlds. A set of agents is given, and a body of information is
associated with each agent at each world. Generally, this is modelled
with an agent-relative accessibility relation between worlds.
Knowability ascriptions are then interpreted as follows: it is true at
world w that a is in a position to know p just in case p is true at every
possible world accessible from w by agent a, that is, just in case ‰p is
incompatible with the agent’s information at w. Public announcement
logic adds a natural dynamics to this picture: the receipt of new in-
formation is modelled as the intersection between it and the prior
body of information (cf. the notion of conditional probability in
Bayesian probability theory).
We render this more precisely, in a manner that departs slightly
from the usual presentations but lays the groundwork for the KRI
framework of §3. We can eliminate any mention of individual
agents (and world-relative accessibilities) without betraying the fea-
tures we want to emphasize.
A standard model forL is a tuple hW ,Si, where W is a non-empty
set of worlds and S  W LAT is an interpretation of the atomic
claims inL. This relates worlds to atoms: we read ‘w S p’ as meaning
that p is true at w, and ‘w 1S p’ as  w S p. Next, S is extended to
all formulae of L as follows:
w S‰A , w 1S A
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w S A ^ B , w S A & w S B
w S A _ B , w S A or w S B
w S A 3B , 8w1ðw1S A ) w1S BÞ
w SKAB , 8w1ðw1S A ) w1S BÞ
The interpreted language contains a redundancy: A 3B and KAB have
the same interpretation. But their meanings will diverge in our frame-
work below, and it will prove useful to frame various principles of
interest using both linguistic devices.
We define logical consequence in the standard way, as truth pres-
ervation at all worlds of all admissible models. With S a set of
formulae:
S S B , in all standard models hW , Si and for all w 2 W :
w S A for all A 2 S) w S B
We write A S B for fAg S B. As a special case, logical validity,
S A—truth at all worlds of all standard models—is  S A, entail-
ment by the empty set. One might label the set of all such validities
core standard epistemic logic.
Given this core framework, one can clarify and contrast more
refined epistemic logics by restricting the class of standard models.
Each such restriction—a proposed class of admissible models—is a
proposal as to which models capture a genuine possibility for an
agent’s epistemic status, and generates its own set of corresponding
validities. Admissibility is key: relative to a core framework, a debate as
to which logic is the epistemic logic may be framed as a debate over
what should count as an admissible model.
The logic induced by the semantics for the extensional operators is
just classical propositional logic, A 3B and KAB being notational vari-
ants for a strict S5-like conditional, often called ‘strict implication’.
Key consequences of the standard approach are now easily established:
. (Logical Omniscience) S B ) SKAB for every A
. (Closure Under Known Implication) fKAB, KAðB  CÞg SKAC
. (Closure Under Strict Implication) fKAB, B 3Cg SKAC
. (Monotonicity) fA 3B, KBCg SKAC
. (Transitivity) fKAB, KBCg SKAC
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In the current setting, the last three items say the same thing with
different symbols.
2.3 Kripke and Harman’s dogmatism paradox
We now present our case study, a paradox due to Kripke (2011b),
which first appeared in (Harman, 1973, ch. 9, §2), reporting on a
lecture by Kripke. Notably, it applies as much to perfectly ideal
agents as to ordinary ones. Appealing replies to the paradox cast
doubt either on the above mentioned closure principles or on mono-
tonicity. Rather than arguing for any reply in particular, we emphasize
the plausibility of some; whether or not they are best in the final
analysis, they deserve to be taken seriously. It is, therefore, desirable
to develop a logical framework that allows us to study the theories
recommended by such replies.11
Suppose that P is true and E is true and R is true, where R is the
claim that E is generally a good reason to think that P is false. Let M be
the claim that E is misleading information on the question of P. The
following seems true:
(1) If P is true and E is generally a good reason to think that P is
false, then it must be that if E is true then E is misleading
information on the question of P. That is,
ðP ^ RÞ 3ðE  MÞ.
Now suppose that agent a knows that P ^ R at time t0 on the basis
of information I1. Using Closure Under Strict Implication, we may
conclude:
(2) a is in a position at t0 to know that E  M .
Suppose that a comes to know E at time t1 on the basis of new
information I2. Presumably, her information is now I1 ^ I2. Using
monotonicity, we get:
(3) a is in a position at t1 to know that E  M .
Since a also knows E at t1, we can apply Closure Under Known
Implication:
(4) a is in a position at t1 to know that M.
11 For further discussion of the paradox, see Sorensen (1988), Lasonen-Aarnio (2014), and
(Sosa, 2017, ch. 10).
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If a knows that E is misleading, then presumably she is rational, in
the face of E, to continue believing P, ignoring the ‘usual implications’
of E.
But, as Kripke (2011b) stresses, this result is completely general and
therefore coalesces into a principle of dogmatism: knowing agents are
immune to rational persuasion with new evidence! This is highly
counter-intuitive. It is well known that Kripke first proved certain
results in modal logic. Suppose that one comes across a letter,
signed by Kripke and addressed to Nozick, in which Kripke confesses
to having plagiarized the results. As it happens, the contents of the
letter are false (representing a private joke between Kripke and
Nozick) but one is unaware of this. Intuitively, the new informa-
tion—for example, that such a letter exists— undermines one’s ra-
tional belief in the claim that Kripke produced the results, and thereby
undermines one’s knowledge. However, the reasoning from (1) to (4)
seems to advocate that one can (and should) resist this change in
belief, since one knows that the new information is misleading on
the question of Kripke’s accomplishments. But, intuitively, it is pre-
cisely the fact that one does not know this that fuels a rational loss of
belief.
This inspires a quandary. Suppose we accept the conclusion of
the paradox. Still, our ordinary (purported) claims to knowledge
can obviously be challenged with new counter-evidence. Thus
these claims must be, on reflection, false. Scepticism looms.
Alternatively, we need to defy the reasoning that leads to the paradox-
ical conclusion.
One route for defiance is that of (Harman, 1973, ch. 9, §2). It targets
monotonicity. Consider the step from (2) to (3): if E  M is knowable
at t0, then it remains knowable at t1 if the only change to the agent’s
psychology is that they have received new information. To abandon
monotonicity is to allow that the receipt of I2 might reduce what is
knowable. In particular, one might accept counter-instances to mono-
tonicity of the form:
ðI1 ^ I2Þ 3I1
KI1ðE  MÞ
‰KI1^I2ðE  MÞ
Another route for defiance is that of Sharon and Spectre (2010, 2017).
It targets epistemic closure. The paradox relies heavily on the closure of
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knowledge under strict implication. One may therefore take the para-
dox as pointing to counter-instances to closure of the form:
KI1ðP ^ RÞ
ðP ^ RÞ 3ðE  MÞ
‰KI1ðE  MÞ
Closure has perhaps stronger intuitive plausibility than monotonicity,
so it is worth bolstering the appeal of the current act of defiance. Note
that Harman’s solution, taken by itself, concedes that (2) holds. Thus,
at t0, the agent knows that any counter-evidence to P that she might
receive is guaranteed to be misleading. We can accept, with Harman,
that if actually presented with new counter-evidence, the agent would
be rationally swayed and lose some knowledge.
But a residual paradox remains: it seems that, at t0, the agent would
be rational to do everything she can to avoid any possible counter-
evidence— especially if she knows that it will hold her under its sway
if it appears. As Kripke (2011b) points out, this is an equally repellent
form of dogmatism, according to which a rational agent is entitled to
actively avoid persons or books or other sources of information that
challenge whatever views she takes to constitute her knowledge. Hence
one can appreciate the appeal of restricting closure and thereby allow-
ing for knowing agents who are receptive to counter-argument.12
This suggests that the dogmatism paradox encompasses two sub-
paradoxes: one based on monotonicity, one based on closure. To
clarify this, we attend to what we take to be the essential structure
of the paradoxical reasoning (notice that this presentation finds no use
for Closure Under Known Implication):
(5) P 3‰ðE ^ ‰PÞ by classical propositional and modal logic
(6) KI1P Premiss
(7) KI1‰ðE ^ ‰PÞ by (5), (6) and Closure Under Strict Implication
(8) KI1^I2E Premiss
(9) KI1^I2‰ðE ^ ‰PÞ by (7) and Monotonicity
(10) KI1^I2ðE ^ ‰ðE ^ ‰PÞÞ by (8), (9) and Adjunction
12 (Sharon and Spectre, 2010, pp. 310–11) makes a similar point, apparently independently.
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(11) ðE ^ ‰ðE ^ ‰PÞÞ 3P by classical propositional
and modal logic
(12) KI1^I2P by (10), (11) and Closure Under Strict Implication
To discern the stakes, again interpret E as a claim that inductively
supports ‰P. We now use ‰ðE ^ ‰PÞ to capture the idea that E is
misleading if E and P are true.13 (12) captures a significant element of
the paradoxical reasoning: new information cannot yield counter-evi-
dence that undermines previous knowledge, since an agent knows that
any counter-evidence is misleading; see (10).
But to achieve a paradox using monotonicity, the intervening steps
from (7) to (11) are inessential. Our first sub-paradox:
(13) KI1P Premiss
(14) KI1^I2P by Monotonicity from (13)
In the abstract, this reasoning is intuitive. Putting aside memory fail-
ure, information seems cumulative: new information can only tell one
more about the world. But the example of losing one’s knowledge of
the genesis of Kripke’s theorem, through the misleading letter, bears
directly on the reasoning from (13) to (14), and so on monotonicity
directly. We intuitively judge in this particular case that knowledge can
be lost with the accrual of novel knowledge-producing information,
since that information undermines formerly rational beliefs (and so
knowledge resting on those beliefs).
On the other hand, (5), (6) and (7) provide a closure-based sub-
paradox:
(15) P 3‰ðE ^ ‰PÞ Premiss
(16) KI P Premiss
(17) KI‰ðE ^ ‰PÞ by (15), (16) and Closure Under
Strict Implication
This is independently puzzling. For emphasis, set E to be I. Then
‰ðI ^ ‰PÞ says that the agent’s total information I is not misleading
on the question of P. But then (15), (16) and (17) seem to say: if one
knows anything, one is positioned to know that one’s total informa-
tion is never misleading. But isn’t it objectionably circular to claim
13 This technique for formalizing misleading evidence has proven useful in epistemology:
see, for instance, Vogel (2014).
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that one’s total information gives assurance that one’s total informa-
tion is never misleading? We have a version of the classic ‘Problem of
the Criterion’ (Chisholm 1973; Cohen 2002).
Thus there is motivation for introducing a framework for epistemic
logic with the resources for rejecting both monotonicity and closure.
3. Semantics for KRI
We now present the KRI semantics for our epistemic language L
from §2.1. It is informed by three ideas. (1) The content of an inter-
preted sentence is fruitfully modelled with two components: a truth set
and a topic, or subject matter. Specifically, this is so for a sentence
expressing an agent’s total information. (2) The topic of information I
restricts what is knowable on the basis of I to propositions about that
same subject matter. This impinges on epistemic closure. (3) Total
information is a mere upper bound on knowability relative to infor-
mation: in the best case, an agent knows that I, where I is her total
information. But she may not be so lucky: knowledge based on I might
defeat knowledge that follows, in the absence of defeaters, from a mere
part of I. This impinges on monotonicity.
We identify L with the set of its well-formed formulae. A frame
for L is a tuple, F = hW , fRA j A 2 Lg,T,  , ti, understood as
follows. W is a non-empty set of possible worlds. fRA j A 2Lg is a
set of accessibilities between worlds: each A 2L has its own
RA  W  W . Such accessibilities will make our KAs non-monotonic,
addressing one half of the dogmatism paradox. T is a non-empty set
of topics. Abstractly, topics are the situations or distinctions a given
bit of information is epistemically relevant for, in a certain context and
for the agent involved. Intuitively, the topic of a meaningful sentence
or discourse is what it is about, a dimension of meaning that (as
stressed in such influential works as Yablo 2014) goes beyond condi-
tions of truth at a possible world: ‘2þ 2 ¼ 4’ and ‘Either Jane is late or
she is not’ are true at exactly the same possible worlds (all of them).
But they differ along the dimension of topic: one is about Jane, the
other is not. The notion of topic can naturally explain various hyper-
intensional aspects of natural language. And the topic-sensitivity of
our KAs will deliver failures of closure that address the other half of the
dogmatism paradox.
Mathematics has topology as a sub-topic. Philosophy and mathem-
atics overlap (they have a common sub-topic: logic). The topic Jane’s
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profession is included in a larger topic: Jane. Thus, topics can have sub-
topics, can overlap, and can be included in larger topics. To capture
these ideas, we have  as topic fusion, a binary operation on T that
combines two topics into, intuitively, the smallest topic of which they
are both a part. We take  to satisfy, for all x, y, z 2T:
(Idempotence) x  x ¼ x
(Commutativity) x  y ¼ y  x
(Associativity) ðx  yÞ  z ¼ x  ðy  zÞ
We accept unrestricted fusion, that is,  is always defined on T:
8xy 2T 9z 2Tðz ¼ x  yÞ. We then define topic parthood, 	, in
the usual way: 8xy 2Tðx 	 y , x  y ¼ yÞ. This makes parthood
a partial ordering— for all x, y, z 2T:
(Reflexivity) x 	 x
(Antisymmetry) x 	 y & y 	 x ) x ¼ y
(Transitivity) x 	 y & y 	 z ) x 	 z
Thus hT,i is a join semilattice, as in Berto (2018a, 2018b). We can,
additionally, stipulate that it be complete: any set of topics S T has a
fusion S. As a final technical assumption, we will think of all topics in
T as built via fusions out of the smallest possible topics, namely, atomic
topics. Atomic topics have no proper parts: AtomðxÞ ,  9yðy < xÞ,
with < the strict order defined from 	.
hT,i is needed to assign topics to formulae ofL, as follows. Our
t in F above is a function t :LAT !T, such that if p 2LAT , then
tðpÞ 2 fx 2TjAtomðxÞg: atomic formulae have atomic topics (this is
an idealization: grammatically simple sentences of everyday language
can involve intuitively complex topics; but it will streamline our dis-
cussion). Next, t is extended to the whole ofL by taking a formula as
having as topic the fusion of what its atomic formulae are about. If the
set of atomic formulae in a formula A 2L is AtA ¼ fp1, …, png, then:
tðAÞ ¼ AtA ¼ tðp1Þ  
 
 
  tðpnÞ
Topical hyperintensionality is less fine-grained than the syntax of our
language. By induction on the construction of formulae, not only
tðAÞ ¼ tð‰‰AÞ (remember Frege on how double negation is Sinn-
preserving), but also tðAÞ ¼ tð‰AÞ: the topic of a formula is that of
its negation (‘Snow is white’ is about snow’s whiteness, just as ‘Snow is
Mind, Vol. 00 . 0 . 2018  The Author(s) 2018.
Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs
licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly
cited. For commercial re-use, please contactjournals.permissions@oup.com
Knowability Relative to Information 13
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/m
ind/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/m
ind/fzy045/5144607 by guest on 28 O
ctober 2018
not white’). And not only tðA ^ BÞ ¼ tðB ^ AÞ, but also, for example,
tðA ^ BÞ ¼ tðAÞ  tðBÞ ¼ tðA _ BÞ. These identities are taken as re-
quirements for a good theory of aboutness- or content-inclusion in
Yablo (2014), Fine (2016), and Hawke (2017a).
A frame becomes a model M = hW , fRA j A 2Lg,T,  , t ,i
when one adds an interpretation   W LAT . This relates
worlds to atomic formulae: again, we read ‘w p’ as meaning that p
is true at w, and ‘w 1p’ as  w p. Next,  is extended to all for-
mulae of L as follows:
ðS‰Þw ‰A , w 1A
ðS^Þw A ^ B , w A & w B
ðS_Þw A _ B , w A or w B
ðS-3Þw A 3B , 8w1ðw1A ) w1BÞ
SKð Þw KAB , 8w1ðwRAw1 ) w1BÞ & tðBÞ 	 tðAÞ14
Read ‘wRAw1’ as ‘relative to w: w1 is epistemically accessible on the
basis of total information that A’ (or ‘relative to w: w1 is not ruled out
by knowledge that can be based on the total information that A’).
Accessibilities are thus indexed to information: different informational
inputs will commit the agent to different epistemic possibilities.
Following Lewis (1973)’s worlds semantics for counterfactuals, (SK)
can be equivalently expressed using set-selection functions. Each
A 2L comes with a function fA : W ! PðW Þ, taking as input the
world where the information is had by the agent, and giving as output
the set of epistemically accessible worlds, fAðwÞ ¼ fw1 2 W jwRAw1g.
Let jAj denote A’s truth set: fw 2 W jw Ag. Then we can rephrase
(SK), equivalently, as:
SKð Þ w KAB , fAðwÞ  jBj & tðBÞ 	 tðAÞ
Set-selection functions also tersely express a natural Basic Constraint
on the semantics—that for all A 2L and w 2 W :
BCð Þ jAj  fAðwÞ15
14 Compare analytic implication in the conceptivist literature: see Ferguson (2014) for an
overview.
15 Caution could tempt one towards a weaker basic constraint. For instance: for all w 2 W ,
if w 2 jAj then w 2 fAðwÞ (Chellas, 1975, p. 42). This yields a strictly weaker logic than (BC)
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(BC) says that A-worlds are always A-selected: no world in which A is
true is ruled out by knowledge based on total information A. Besides
being intrinsically plausible, this will come in handy to prove some
simple results below. From now on, we will only consider models
satisfying (BC). Notice what (BC) does not ensure: that every world
in which A is false is ruled out by knowledge based on A.16
We again define logical consequence as truth preservation at all
worlds of all models. With S a set of formulae:
S B , in all models M = hW , fRA j A 2Lg,T,  , t ,i and for
all w 2 W : w A for all A 2 S) w B
We keep using A B as shorthand for fAg B and A as shorthand
for  A. The set of validities induced by this framework gives a core
logic for KRI, from which more refined theories are set by restricting
the class of admissible models. We start by commenting on the key
clause of the semantics: (SK).
4. Knowability, information
(SK) requires two things for KAB to come out true: (1) it embeds a
truth-conditional requirement—that B be true throughout a selected
set of worlds compatible with the information that A; and (2) it
embeds a topicality requirement: that B be fully on topic with respect
to A. Knowability is, then, determined by the available information
twice over, once via the worlds it makes epistemically accessible and
once via the topic it concerns.
This complies with insights about informativeness and its relation
to knowledge. Consider the picture emerging from Dretske (1999).
Knowledge depends on information: to learn that Beth’s grandmother
is ill, one requires information to that effect. Information should not
be conflated with meaning: if I am passed a note that reads ‘Beth’s
grandmother is ill’, written by someone who chose that sentence using
(for example, transitivity is lost). This strikes us as unnecessarily cautious. Thanks to an
anonymous referee for this journal for pressing us on this.
16 One anonymous referee for this journal rightly asked, what of further constraints on RA
or fA, for example, making our RAs equivalence relations, or transitive ones, and so on? In the
standard framework of epistemic logic, these are linked to the debate about the validity of
principles like the KK principle or Positive Introspection (if one knows that A, does one know
that one knows that A?). We make no commitment on these, given our aim, stated at the start,
of providing a fairly neutral epistemic logic, and the fact that such principles are controversial
already in the standard Hintikkan framework. We will, however, discuss the plausibility of one
further constraint involving both fA and topics in §11 below.
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a random device, then that sentence is meaningful but carries no
information about the state of health of Beth’s grandmother. Even if
the sentence is true, I cannot learn anything about Beth’s grandmother
from it.
Nevertheless, information may be regarded as semantic (Floridi
2015) to the extent that, firstly, it eliminates possibilities, just as the
truth of a meaningful sentence is, in general, compatible with some
possibilities and not others; and secondly, it is about something, just
as a meaningful sentence has a subject matter that it addresses.17
Abstractly, an information source divides logical space into a partition
of possibilities and selects between them (definitively, if it is noise-
free). What the information licenses as true is captured by the selec-
tion. What the information is about is captured by the distinctions
that mark the borders of the partition. If the information source (say,
a voice on the telephone) reports on the health of Beth’s grandmother
(call her ‘X’), then it divides logical space, roughly, into cells such as: X
is fit and hearty; X is under the weather; X has been hospitalized. It
need not discriminate between X’s being the grandmother of Sue and
Y’s being her grandmother. Nor need it carry the information that
2þ 2 ¼ 4, despite this being strictly implied by any true claim. Nor
need it carry information about the source itself: it needn’t report that
the telephone connection is noise-free, for instance.
Dretske takes information to be veridical: ‘false information and mis-
information are not kinds of information—any more than decoy ducks
and rubber ducks are kinds of ducks’ (Dretske, 1999, p. 45; emphasis in
original). KRI semantics makes no such assumption. We will be neutral
on whether information is always true or can be false; no invalidity we
prove depends on the existence of false information; and no validity
depends on the assumption that information must be true.
We now expound some logical validities and invalidities in the
semantics. These will highlight how KRI fares with respect to the
issues presented for the standard epistemic framework in §2.2.
5. Factivity, conjunction, paradox
Our first logical validity is:
Factivity
  fKAB, Ag B
17 These aspects have long been recognized, though emphasized in distinct traditions: com-
pare information-as-range and information-as-correlation in van Benthem and Martinez (2008).
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This is immediately guaranteed by our Basic Constraint.18 This validity
expresses the factivity of KRI: when B is knowable relative to the
information that A, and A is true, B must be true as well.
It is easy to show that our framework does not validate a different
factivity principle:
KAB 6¥A
This is crucial for accommodating theorists that allow non-veridical
information. However, it is not an endorsement of the possibility of
false information. Recall that our intuitive reading of KAB has a sub-
junctive flavour: ‘If the total given information were A, then B would
be knowable’. Now if information is necessarily veridical, then one
should also accept, ‘If the total given information were A, then A
would be true’. But one need not accept that the intuitive reading
of KAB entails ‘A is true’: the subjunctive might be true, intuitively,
because receiving A positions one to know B at all (nearby) worlds
where A is true.
The next validities show that KRI is closed with respect to conjunc-
tion introduction and elimination:
Simplificationð Þ KAðB ^ CÞ KAB KAðB ^ CÞ KAC 19
The ‘tracking’ notion of knowledge due to Nozick (1981) does not
necessitate that one who knows a conjunction is positioned to know
the conjuncts. According to Kripke (2011a), this is a damning defect
for Nozick’s approach. KRI is free from such a defect.20
The companion of Simplification is:
Adjunction
  fKAB, KACg KAðB ^ CÞ21
If, given information A, both B and C are knowable, then B ^ C is
knowable too. Despite its intuitive plausibility, there is a case for
viewing this validity as a drawback. Consider the preface paradox,
18 Proof. Let w A and w KAB. By the former, w 2 jAj, so (BC) applies: w 2 fAðwÞ. Then
by the latter and (SK), w B.
19 Proof. We do the first one; for the second, replace B with C appropriately. Let
w KAðB ^ CÞ. By (SK), for all w1 such that wRAw1, w1B ^ C; thus by (S^), w1B. Also,
tðB ^ CÞ ¼ tðBÞ  tðCÞ 	 tðAÞ, and thus tðBÞ 	 tðAÞ. Then, by (SK) again, w KAB.
20 See Hawke (2016) for further frameworks for epistemic logic that validate simplification
without validating closure under strict implication.
21 Proof. Let w KAB and w KAC, that is, by (SK): for all w1 such that wRAw1, w1B
and w1C, so by (S^) w1B ^ C. Also, tðBÞ 	 tðAÞ and tðCÞ 	 tðAÞ, and thus
tðBÞ  tðCÞ ¼ tðB ^ CÞ 	 tðAÞ. Then, by (SK) again, w KAðB ^ CÞ.
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due to Makinson (1965). An author has written a particularly well-
researched book. In fact, every claim in the book is an instance of
knowledge for her. Nevertheless, with appropriate epistemic modesty,
her preface admits that she cannot guarantee that her long book is
error-free as a whole. One might conclude that the author is not
positioned to know the conjunction of every claim in the book. One
plausible reaction is that we have identified a counter-instance to
Adjunction. The current system—like the standard framework—
cannot accommodate a theory of knowability that embraces this
reaction.
Nevertheless—unlike the standard framework—KRI can accommo-
date subtler forms of the debate. A principle akin to Adjunction is
invalid in the semantics:
Unwise Adjunction
  fKA1B, KA2Cg6¥KA1^A2ðB ^ CÞ
(This invalidity is closely related to that of Monotonicity, which we
address next.) Now consider a second take on the core issue of the
preface phenomenon: for every claim in her book, the author has
presumably received some information that renders that claim know-
able relative to that exact information. However, might it be that her
total information does not render the book’s conjoined content know-
able? By denying that information and its resultant knowledge can
always be simultaneously adjoined, a proponent of KRI can answer
in the affirmative.
6. Non-monotonicity, transitivity, stability
KRI is non-monotonic in the following sense:
KAB 6¥KA^CB22
Topicality is preserved here, for in general if tðBÞ 	 tðAÞ, then also
tðBÞ 	 tðAÞ  tðCÞ ¼ tðA ^ CÞ. Our epistemic operators, however,
are of variable strictness: fAðwÞ can differ from fA^CðwÞ.
Here’s an example drawing on (Hawthorne, 2004, p. 71).23 Assume
that information is veridical. At the actual world @, agent a reads in
22 Counterexample: Let W ¼ fw, w1g, w Rp-accesses nothing, wRp^r w1, w11q, tðpÞ ¼ tðqÞ
¼ tðrÞ. Then w Kpq, but w 1Kp^r q.
23 Hawthorne’s example is similar, but developed with a different purpose: to serve as a
puzzle about closure. As he acknowledges, the puzzle is essentially the closure-based sub-
paradox of the dogmatism paradox. Hawthorne’s verdict is that closure can be preserved:
knowing that A puts one in a position to know that any evidence against A is misleading,
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The Times that Manchester United won. We use M to name the prop-
osition that Manchester United won and T to name the proposition
that The Times reported that M. The Times is a trusted and reliable
source, which offers a correct report. Hence, a is informed that M ^ T
and thereby comes to know M ^ T . We can model this with a set-
selection function: fM^T ð@Þ ¼ jM j \ jT j, with @ 2 jM j \ jT j. Hence
@KM^T M .
But a reads The Globe next, which reports that Manchester United
lost. This, unbeknown to a, is a rare instance of a misprint in The Globe,
which is itself trusted and reliable. Hence, The Globe is uninformative
about the game’s outcome (that is, on the question of M). Nevertheless,
glancing at the report yields some new information for a: proposition G,
that The Globe reported a loss. Intuitively, receiving this new information
undermines a’s knowledge that M. In particular, she should rationally
suspend judgement on this claim. We can model this as follows:
fM^T^Gð@Þ ¼ jT j \ jGj, with @ 2 jT j \ jGj and jM j \ jT j \ jGj
(jT j \ jGj. Note that this accords with constraint (BC), since
jM j \ jT j \ jGj  fM^T^Gð@Þ. Thus the information M ^ T ^ G
leaves only T ^ G-worlds epistemically accessible, but allows for some
‰M-worlds. Hence @KM^T^GG, but @‰KM^T^GM .
What if one allows for false information? Such a theorist might de-
scribe the situation differently: since both The Globe and The Times are
reliable and trusted, they both furnish information on the question of
M. However, they conflict, yielding M and ‰M respectively. The total
information is thus T ^ G ^ M ^ ‰M . Presumably, knowledge of M
cannot be achieved here, since the conflicting pieces of information
cancel each other out. Hence @KM^T M , but @‰KT^G^M^‰M M .
This is modelled with fT^G^M^‰M ð@Þ ¼ jT j \ jGj.
On the other hand, thanks to (BC), KRI respects:
Transitivity
  fKAB, KBCg KAC24
Knowledge is stable: old knowledge cannot be lost as new knowledge is
accumulated. The intuitive case for monotonicity is that it captures
but the latter is ‘junk knowledge’ that is ‘destroyed’ if new evidence is actually received, as in
Sorensen (1988) (see Sharon and Spectre 2010, §4 for push-back). This last part indicates that
Hawthorne (2004) advocates monotonicity-rejection. Our development of his example is in
this spirit.
24 Proof. Assume that w KAB and w KBC. Thus 8w1ðwRAw1 ) w1BÞ & tðBÞ 	 tðAÞ and
8w2ðwRBw2 ) w2CÞ & tðCÞ 	 tðBÞ. Then tðCÞ 	 tðBÞ 	 tðAÞ. Further, by (BC), we have that
jBj  fBðwÞ and, by (SK), that fBðwÞ  jCj. Thus jBj  jCj. Now, by (SK) again, we have that
fAðwÞ  jBj. Hence, fAðwÞ  jCj.
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the core idea of the stability of knowledge. KRI suggests a different
hypothesis: knowledge is stable in that it respects Transitivity. Suppose
C is known on the basis of information B. And suppose that one’s
information is refined in so far as new information A is received upon
which knowledge of B can be based. Transitivity says that C is still
knowable: no knowledge is lost in the update from B to A.25
We illustrate with a version of the dogmatism paradox that hinges
on Transitivity. Suppose:
KP^RðE  MÞ and K E^P^RðP ^ RÞ
with P, E, R, M as in §2.3. That is, suppose that the joint information
that P is true and that E supports ‰P renders it knowable that E is
misleading if true; and that refining the information to E ^ P ^ R
renders it jointly knowable that P and that E supports ‰P. In this
case, an advocate of Transitivity must accept that an agent with the
refined information is positioned to know that E is misleading if true:
KE^P^RðE  MÞ
Once again, when generalized, this seems an objectionable conclusion.
However, defiance in the style of Harman (1973) is here best inter-
preted as doubt about the truth of KE^P^RðP ^ RÞ. That an agent has
received, in total, the information that E ^ P ^ R need not position
her to know P: her resultant knowledge that E is true and E supports
‰P defeats rational belief in P. Defiance in the style of Sharon and
Spectre (2010) is here best interpreted as doubt about the truth of
KP^RðE  MÞ. That an agent has received, in total, the information
that P ^ R cannot, in general, position her to know that E is mislead-
ing if true. Thus, standard responses to the paradox provide little
motivation for rejecting Transitivity.
An advocate of inductive knowledge might be suspicious of
Transitivity.26 Let S be the (true) claim that smoke is rising above
the tree-line, along with background information on the frequent cor-
relation between smoke and wildfire. Let F be the (true) claim that
there is a raging wildfire in the forest. Let C be the claim that there is
an inhabited cabin in the vicinity, with a chimney leading from its
fireplace. S, we suppose, provides inductive knowledge of F, in the
25 This echoes the Xerox Principle endorsed by (Dretske, 1999, p. 57): if A carries the
information that B, and B carries the information that C, then A carries the information
that C.
26 Thanks to Alexandru Baltag for highlighting the issue of inductive knowledge.
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absence of defeaters. Further, we suppose that C is exactly such a
defeater. Hence, an alleged counterexample to Transitivity:
KS^CS and KSF , but ‰KS^CF
That is, to receive the information that there is smoke positions one to
know there is (smoke and) fire, unless defeating information is also
received.
We reject this counterexample: the above formalization seems a
poor representation of the scenario at issue. That smoke signals fire
is analogous to a voice on a telephone signalling that Beth’s grand-
mother is ill, the headline of The Times signalling that Manchester
United won, or Koplik spots signalling that a patient has measles. The
former situation carries information about the latter. Coming to know
that there is fire on the basis of smoke is like coming to know grandma
is ill from a telephone call: the information that F is thereby trans-
mitted, in a manner conducive to knowledge. To learn subsequently of
the cabin is to lose knowledge of F despite having received the infor-
mation that F, just as one loses the knowledge that grandma is ill when
given a reason to doubt the testimony of the speaker or doubt the
quality of the telephone line.27 Such thinking is central in philosoph-
ical theories of information: the idea that information about a situ-
ation may flow to a receiver via a second situation—a carrier—is
prominent in (Dretske, 1999, ch. 5), (Skyrms, 2010, ch. 3), and situ-
ation theory (Barwise and Etchemendy 1987; Barwise and Seligman
1995; van Benthem and Martinez 2008; Seligman 2014). Consider:
At this point some philosophers will say ‘You might as well say that smoke
carries information about fire’. Well, doesn’t it? Don’t fossils carry
information about past life forms? Doesn’t the cosmic background
radiation carry information about the early stages of the universe? The
world is full of information. (Skyrms, 2010, p. 44; emphasis in original)
A better formalization of the above scenario, therefore, does not bear
on Transitivity:
KS^F^CS and KS^FF , but ‰KS^F^CF
To receive the information that there is smoke is to receive the infor-
mation that there is fire, positioning one to know there is (smoke and)
fire, unless defeating information is also received.
27 Here evidence and information seem to pull apart. F, let’s say, becomes part of one’s
information when one sees (and correctly interprets) the smoke. However, F does not seem to
be part of one’s evidence; rather, knowledge that F seems inferentially based one’s evidence,
for example, the appearance as of smoke.
Mind, Vol. 00 . 0 . 2018  The Author(s) 2018.
Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs
licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial reproduction and distribution of
the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any way, and that the work is properly
cited. For commercial re-use, please contactjournals.permissions@oup.com
Knowability Relative to Information 21
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/m
ind/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/m
ind/fzy045/5144607 by guest on 28 O
ctober 2018
(If sceptical that smoke carries the information that there is a wild-
fire for agents who know of the cabin, one might prefer KS^CS and
KS^F F, but ‰KS^CF .)
7. Disjunction, paradox
The following principle fails in our basic system:
Additionð Þ KAB 6¥KAðB _ CÞ28
This inference fails for the right reason, according to theorists such as
Yablo (2014), who endorse the topic-sensitivity of knowability: al-
though A A _ B, disjunction can bring in alien topics.
This is easily motivated as a feature of agents who lack unlimited
conceptual tools, even when they have unlimited deductive powers. If
an agent knows that 2þ 2 ¼ 4 but does not possess the concept of an
astronaut, it is at best misleading to claim that their information
positions them to know that either 2þ 2 ¼ 4 or Neil Armstrong
was an astronaut.
But topic-sensitivity grounds a plausible rationale for rejecting un-
restricted closure even for ideal agents with a full repertoire of con-
cepts. A topic is closely associated with a set of distinctions, issues or
questions (Lewis 1988; Yablo 2014; Hawke 2017a). To say that know-
ability is topic-sensitive is just to say that what is knowable on a
certain body of information depends on what that information is
about: what distinctions it speaks to, what issues it resolves or leaves
open. Now, the most compelling counterexamples to unrestricted
closure can be understood as counterexamples to Addition, rooted
in an enrichment of topic or subject matter. A _ ‰B is equivalent to
‰ð‰A ^ BÞ twice over, that is, both in a truth-conditional sense and
qua topic. Then the validity of Addition would commit one to:
KAB KA‰ð‰B ^ CÞ
But various cases impress philosophers as counterexamples to this
principle—at least those that resist radical scepticism or Moorean
dogmatism.29 Knowing that one has hands (based on ordinary
28 Counterexample: Let W ¼ fw, w1g, wRpw1, w1q, tðpÞ ¼ tðqÞ 6¼ tðrÞ. Then tðqÞ 	 tðpÞ,
so by (SK), w Kpq. But tðq _ rÞ ¼ tðqÞ  tðrÞåtðpÞ, and thus w Kpðq _ rÞ.
29 For further discussion, see Hawke (2016). For an opposing verdict, see Roush (2010),
which gives a nuanced defence of the validity of the above principle. For push-back, see Avnur
et al. (2011) and (Hawke, 2017b, §3.4.5).
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information) does not put one in a position to know that one is not a
handless brain in a vat (Cohen 1988). Knowing that the wall before one
is red (based on the visual information of it looking red) does not put
one in a position to deny that the wall is not red but subject to trick
lighting (Cohen 2002). Knowing that the animal in the zebra enclosure
is a zebra (based on the visual information that it looks like a zebra)
does not put one in a position to know that the animal is not a cleverly
disguised non-zebra (Dretske 1970, 2005). Or, to return to our previ-
ous example, knowing that Kripke produced result X in modal logic
(based on testimony in the classroom) does not put one in a position
to deny the veridicality of a letter signed by Kripke confessing that he
is a fraud.
A different disjunction-involving issue, also adequately modelled in
the semantics, has to do with the fact that KRI can be non-prime due
to indeterminacy in the available information. Your information is
sufficient for you to come to know that Mary is either left- or right-
handed (you have seen that she is a normally endowed human being,
et cetera), but insufficient to establish which one it is. So we need, and
we get:
KAðB _ CÞ6¥KAB _ KAC30
Here, too, the inference fails for the right reason. Topicality is there,
but the different worlds one has access to will fill in the unspecified
details in different ways. There can be worlds where B but not C, and
worlds where C but not B, and both can be compatible with what
information one has.
8. Omniscience
KRI invalidates the rule of Logical Omniscience from §2.2.
B _ ‰B =) KAðB _ ‰BÞ
Topic-preservation fails: t(B) need not be included in t(A), and so
tðB _ ‰BÞ need not be included in t(A). This is a happy outcome if the
goal is to reason about agents lacking the total conceptual repertoire.
30 Counterexample: Let W ¼ fw, w1, w2g, wRpw1, wRpw2, w1q but w11r , w2r but
w21q, tðpÞ ¼ tðqÞ ¼ tðrÞ. Then by (S_), w1q _ r and w2q _ r , so for all wx such that
wRpwx , wxq _ r . Also, tðq _ rÞ ¼ tðqÞ  tðrÞ 	 tðpÞ, and thus by (SK), w Kpðq _ rÞ.
However, w 1Kpq and w 1Kr r for both q and r fail at some Rp-accessible world. Thus by
(S_), w 1Kpq _ Kpr .]
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On the other hand, as we envision the KRI semantics as governing
agents who are idealized in the sense of being logically astute and fully
rational, one would expect some version of logical omniscience to be
captured by the system. It is straightforward to see that KRI validates a
principle of omniscience with a topicality constraint:
(Topical Omniscience) If B and for all models tðBÞ 	 tðAÞ, KAB
For instance:
KA^BðB _ ‰BÞ
A logically astute agent will always be in the position to know a logical
truth, once she is provided with information allowing her access to the
concepts involved in it.
9. Closure under (known) implication
Another invalidity displays the essential form of closure failure for
KRI, namely that of Closure Under Strict Implication from §2.2:
fKAB, B 3Cg6¥KAC 31
Although all the B-worlds are C-worlds, and thus all the A-selected B-
worlds are C-worlds, the strict implication is not topic-preserving: A
may be information about the topic of B yet not be information about
the topic of C. Thus, given A, one can come to know B but not C even
if there just is no way for B to be true while C is not.
The idea applies nicely to Cartesian scepticism (Dretske 1970): one’s
ordinary empirical information, delivered via sensory perception, may
put one in the position to know one has hands. One’s having hands is
incompatible with one’s being a bodiless brain in a vat whose phe-
nomenal experience is systematically misleading. Yet it might seem
implausible that ordinary empirical information puts one in a position
to rule out a brain-in-a-vat scenario.
Crucially, KRI not only invalidates Closure Under Strict
Implication, but seems to invalidate the right instances of the prin-
ciple. Looking again at the results of §§5 and 7, KAðB ^ CÞ ensures
KAB, but KAB does not ensure KAðB _ CÞ. While the former appears
indisputable, it is far from clear that knowability is closed under the
31 Counterexample: Let W ¼ fw, w1g, wRpw1, w 1q, w1q, w1r , tðpÞ ¼ tðqÞ 6¼ tðrÞ. Then
fpðwÞ  jqj and tðqÞ 	 tðpÞ, and thus by (SK), w Kpq. Also, jqj  jrj, and thus by (S3),
w q 3r . But although fpðwÞ  jrj, tðrÞåtðpÞ, and thus w 1Kpr .
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introduction of arbitrary disjuncts. Intuitively, the received informa-
tion may not be about the topic of the alien disjunct.
Or suppose that one rejects unrestricted closure on the basis that
various epistemic paradoxes (the dogmatism paradox, the Cartesian
paradox) are best interpreted as counter-instances. One should then
hope to invalidate any instance of Closure Under Strict Implication
that can be used to construct such a paradox. Now the semantics
provides the following (easily, via failure of topic-preservation):
fKAB, B 3Cg6¥KAðB ^ CÞ
If one accepts that KAB and B 3C always ensures KAðB ^ CÞ, then
various paradoxes can be constructed. Suppose that KAðP ^ RÞ and
ðP ^ RÞ 3ðE  MÞ, where P, E, R, M are as in the Kripke-Harman dog-
matism paradox. Then we could conclude KAððP ^ RÞ ^ ðE  MÞÞ. In
other words, if it is known both that P and that E is generally a reason
to reject P, then we could draw the dogmatic conclusion that it is
knowable that P, that E is generally a reason to reject P, and that if E
were true then E would be misleading evidence. This dogmatic conclu-
sion seems no better than that in the original puzzle.
On the other hand, closure under known material implication does
hold—and for good reasons. In the current setting, call this principle
Closure Over Known Implication and Topic:
COOKITð Þ fKAB, KAðB  CÞg KAC 32
COOKIT should hold. Here, both B and B  C are fully on-topic with
respect to the information that A. Also, relative to that information, it
is knowable both that B and that if B is true, C is. Then the agent is in
a position to know that C, relative to the same information A. (The
final proviso is essential: given the non-monotonic features of K high-
lighted above, the inference may fail if the index for the available
information is allowed to change across the involved formulae.) If,
for instance, your information puts you in the position to know both
that Peano’s postulates are true and that if these are then Goldbach’s
conjecture is, then you will also be in the position to know Goldbach’s
conjecture.
Authoritative closure sympathizers tend to cite the powerful intu-
ition that the conclusion of a deductive argument from known
32 Proof. Let w KAB and w KAðB  CÞ. By the former and (SK), for all w1 such that
wRAw1, w1B, and tðBÞ 	 tðAÞ. By the latter and (SK) again, for all w1 such that wRAw1,
w1B  C. Thus for all w1 such that wRAw1, w1C. Also, tðB  CÞ ¼ tðBÞ  tðCÞ 	 tðAÞ, and
thus tðCÞ 	 tðAÞ. Thus by (SK), w KAC.
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premisses must result in knowledge; see, for instance, (Williamson,
2000, p. 118), (Hawthorne, 2004, §1.5), and (Kripke, 2011a, p. 200).
After all, this is the basis for the entire enterprise of mathematics:
few want to deny the epistemic sanctity of mathematical results.
This is often translated into a conviction in closure under strict im-
plication—at least, if we restrict attention to computationally un-
bounded and fully rational agents, for, the rationale goes, the truth
of B 3C is best understood in the setting of epistemic logic as an a
priori truth of some kind.
Now a proponent of KRI need not deny the intuition that deduc-
tion is a sanctified means for extending knowledge. She can, however,
dispute that closure under strict implication best captures this intu-
ition, given apparent counterexamples that can be extracted from epi-
stemic paradoxes. Instead, she posits COOKIT as the uncontroversial
core of the intuition.
10. Closure, apriority
Does acceptance of COOKIT court trouble with regards to epistemic
paradox? It might be proposed, for instance, that the dogmatism para-
dox can be reconstructed for an adherent of COOKIT. The story is
told as follows. Suppose that a has the information that P ^ R at time
t0. Further, since it is knowable a priori that ðP ^ RÞ 3ðE  MÞ, it is
also knowable a priori that ðP ^ RÞ  ðE  MÞ, and hence knowable
on the basis of P ^ R that ðP ^ RÞ  ðE  MÞ. But then COOKIT
yields that a is in a position to know, on the basis of P ^ R, that E
must be misleading if true.
This reasoning betrays a confusion. A proponent of KRI need not
accept that if it is knowable a priori that ðP ^ RÞ  ðE  MÞ, then it is
knowable on the basis of P ^ R that ðP ^ RÞ  ðE  MÞ. In general,
she need not accept that if A is knowable a priori then A is knowable
on the basis of every body of information B. This is not licensed by the
intuitive reading of ‘on the basis of ’ that has been exploited. It is
knowable a priori that 2þ 2 ¼ 4. It would be odd to conclude that
2þ 2 ¼ 4 can be known on the basis of the news that Beth’s grand-
mother is ill.
This clarifies that the semantics embeds an absolute notion of
apriority: what can be known without any empirical information by
a computationally unbounded, fully rational agent with access to the
full repertoire of concepts. Contrast the notion of relative apriority:
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what can be known without empirical information, given a fixed,
possibly incomplete, universe of concepts. Let > denote one’s favour-
ite tautology. Then we read >3 A as ‘A is a priori’. For A is know-
able a priori exactly when conceptual limitations are forgotten and A
is true at every possible world (of course, this is only plausible if
worlds are understood as basic epistemic possibilities, possibly in con-
trast to basic metaphysical possibilities).
With this in mind, a proponent of the KRI semantics can judge the
case from the dogmatism paradox as follows. First, the case is best
described as:
KP^RðP ^ RÞ
‰KP^RððP ^ RÞ 3ðE  MÞÞ
> 3ððP ^ RÞ 3ðE  MÞÞ
‰KP^RðE  MÞ
That is, though P ^ R is known on the basis of the empirical infor-
mation P ^ R, it is not knowable on this basis that ðP ^ RÞ 3ðE  MÞ.
Rather, this fact is known a priori. In particular, this knowledge is
based on concepts that go beyond those that constitute the topic of
P ^ R. In this case, in accord with COOKIT, the proponent of our
system can deny that a is positioned by her empirical information to
know that E  M .
11. Minimal conditional logic
Here are three final principles KRI does not validate:
Reflexivity
  6¥KAA
Cautious Transitivity
  fKAB, KA^BCg6¥KAC
Cautious Monotonicity
  fKAB, KACg6¥KA^BC33
33 Let p, q be atomic formulae (in all of the following, topic assignments don’t matter).
First, a counter-model to Reflexivity. Let W ¼ fw1, w2g, let jpj ¼ fw1g, and let fpðw1Þ ¼ W . It
follows that w11Kpp. Second, a counter-model to Cautious Monotonicity. Let W ¼ fw1, w2g.
Let jpj ¼ W and jqj ¼ fw1g. Let fpðw1Þ ¼ jpj and fp^pðw1Þ ¼ jqj. It follows that
w1Kpp ^ Kp^pq ^ ‰Kpq. Finally, a counter-model to Cautious Transitivity. Let
W ¼ fw1, w2g. Let jpj ¼ fw1g. Let fpðw1Þ ¼ jpj and fp^pðw1Þ ¼ W . It follows that
w1Kpp ^ ‰Kp^pp.
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Gabbay (1985) proposes these as a minimal foundation for a logic of
non-monotonic derivations. In particular, they hold appeal as a base
logic of ceteris paribus conditionals. The KRI semantics piggybacks on
a non-monotonic conditional logic. Thus, we consider whether there
are prima facie motivations for rejecting these validities in a minimal
logic for KRI.
Start with Reflexivity. Consider the following line of reasoning:
(1) KBC Assumption
(2) KA^BðA ^ BÞ by Reflexivity
(3) KA^BB by Simplification
(4) KA^BC by Transitivity
(5) If KBC, then KA^BC by discarding (1)
Thus if Reflexivity is conjoined with background principles we
found to be independently good, we validate Monotonicity—in
the form the dogmatism paradox calls into question. One who
accepts Reflexivity must either reject a Harman-like response to the
dogmatism paradox or bear the cost of rejecting Simplification or
Transitivity.
Counterexamples to Reflexivity can arguably be furnished. If a the-
orist allows non-veridical information, counterexamples are obvious:
if an agent’s total information I has a false part, then factivity assures
that the agent does not know that I. Plausible counterexamples exist
even when information is restricted to the veridical; examples in §6
can be adapted to this effect. Here is another. Suppose that Mary
watches Barack Obama deliver his State of the Union Address, from
a front row seat, hearing distinctly that his first topic is trade. A week
later, Mary ’s memory of the speech remains vivid. Presumably, her
senses informed her that his first topic was trade, she thereby came to
know it, and she now preserves this knowledge via memory. However,
an epistemic peer then claims that Obama’s first topic was gun con-
trol, reminding Mary that her memory can be unreliable. Given this, it
can be rational for Mary to suspend (or weaken) her belief that the
first topic was trade, losing her knowledge. Nevertheless, it remains
true, in an important sense, that Mary has the information that the
first topic was trade (T): she received that information through a
perceptual event which, at the time, was conducive to knowledge.
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The event and its interpretation remain vividly stored in her memory.
So, if I ^ T is Mary ’s total information, ‰KI^T ðI ^ T Þ.34
Turn to Cautious Transitivity and Cautious Monotonicity. The se-
mantics invalidates these because set-selection functions operate on
formulae and, in the base framework, few constraints regulate how sets
are selected for different formulae. (BC) requires the sets selected for
p and for p ^ p, for instance, both to contain every p-world, but
otherwise, no constraint is imposed. Models are allowed where, for
instance, jpj(W , fpðwÞ ¼ jpj and fp^pðwÞ ¼ W .
Thus the question as to whether Cautious Transitivity and Cautious
Monotonicity should be treated as logical truths is bound up with
substantive issues. Does a piece of information have a logical struc-
ture, and in particular, one that mirrors the syntax of a sentence with
which it is expressed? If so, to what extent should an epistemic logic
accommodate agents whose cognition is sensitive to syntax? One
might wish to model agents whose capacity to extract knowledge
from information tracks the complexity of the information’s structure.
This impulse is waged against an insistence that fA^B always selects the
same set as fA when, say, jAj ¼ jA ^ Bj.
One possible view has it that information is unstructured. Or one
might accept that information is structured, but hold that this struc-
ture should be ignored when dealing with idealized agents, as in the
KRI setting. In this case, since p and p ^ p have the same topic and
truth set, they should be treated as equivalent. With this in mind,
consider the class of models that satisfy a Twice Over Equivalence
principle:
(TOE) jAj ¼ jBj & tðAÞ ¼ tðBÞ ) fAðwÞ ¼ fBðwÞ for all w
TOE says that if A and B are equivalent twice over (both true at the
same worlds and about the same same topic), then their set-selection
functions always output the same values. Models complying with TOE
filter out a number of syntactic differences concerning the way infor-
mation is presented, but still allow, via differences in topicality, hyper-
intensional distinctions involving pieces of information with
coincident truth sets. It is easy to check that Cautious Monotonicity
and Cautious Transitivity are validated if we impose this restriction on
the admissible models. It may also be confirmed however, that
34 Compare the famous position of Sellars (1997) that ‘the given’ is a myth: even basic
perceptual evidence—and the knowledge directly based on it—is subject to revision and defeat.
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Monotonicity, in full generality, is not validated by this restricted class.
Compliance with TOE allows that if
jA ^ Bj(jA ^ ðB _ ‰BÞj
then the set selected for A ^ B need not be a subset of that selected for
A ^ ðB _ ‰BÞ, despite these sentences sharing a topic and the former
entailing the latter.
12. Conclusion and further work
This paper has only presented a first exploration of KRI—a general
epistemic logic framework which seems to us both formally simple
and capable of properly dealing with a number of issues in main-
stream epistemology. A first direction of development would consist,
of course, in coming up with a proof system, sound and complete with
respect to the semantics. One second direction may come, as hinted
above, from making the framework dynamic in the sense of dynamic
epistemic logic, thereby capturing the process of knowledge update on
the basis of newly acquired information by means of model
transformations.
A third direction may be to relate and compare our semantics with
recent work in aboutness and truthmaker theory mentioned above,
such as Yablo (2014) and Fine (2014, 2016). So far these theories have
not been developed having epistemic notions in sight (although
Yablo’s chapter 7 does get into the relations between knowledge and
aboutness, in particular, in connection with epistemic closure). While
Yablo retains a possible-worlds apparatus, characterizing subject mat-
ters—what sentences are about—as divisions of the space of worlds,
Fine is not friendly to the notion of a world, and works with a space of
truthmakers which can be fused into further truthmakers. We have
followed an intermediate path, combining possible worlds with a
mereology of topics. Comparing these different approaches, possibly
in order to assess their relative merits, makes for further interesting
work.35
35 Many thanks to our anonymous referees for detailed comments that improved the paper
substantially. For useful remarks, thanks to Giovanni Cina´, Malvin Gattinger, Davide Grossi,
Sonja Smets and Shane Steinert-Threlkeld. Special thanks to Alexandru Baltag and Johan van
Benthem for detailed and stimulating feedback. This research is published within the project
‘The Logic of Conceivability ’, funded by the European Research Council (ERC CoG), Grant
Number 681404.
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